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DOUBLE JEOPARDY
time he entered his plea,' there would be no possibility of sensi-
bly concluding that the surrender of the right to go to the first
jury had been voluntary. 
177
Citing the case at bar as "unique," 178 the court did not base its
conclusion on existing New York precedent. Rather, its analysis
was based on disagreement with what seems to be the leading





(decided December 11, 1990)
A criminal defendant brought a motion to bar his retrial and for
dismissal of his indictment on the grounds that a retrial would
violate his right to protection from double jeopardy under the
federal180 and state181 constitutions. 182 The court held that the
declaration of a mistrial due to the inability of a juror to continue
with deliberations, upon learning that her nephew had been shot
and killed, was within the trial judge's proper discretion and
constituted a "manifest necessity" permitting retrial under double
jeopardy analysis. 183 The court additionally held that the
prosecutor had met his burden of establishing the manifest
necessity. 184
176. Id. at 81, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 416.
177. Id. (quoting United States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560, 568 (1963)).
178. Id. at 71, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 409.
179. 149 Misc. 2d 346, 563 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1990).
180. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
181. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
182. Smith, 149 Misc. 2d at 347, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 1013.
183. Id. at 349, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 1015; see also Illinois v. Somerville, 410
U.S. 458 (1973); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); 3 W. LAFAVE &
J. ISRAEL, CRMIINAL PROCEDURE, § 24.1(c), at 63 (1984) [hereinafter
LAFAVE & ISRAEL].
184. Smith, 149 Misc. 2d at 349, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 1015; see also LAFAVE
& ISRAEL, supra note 184, at 65 (stating that the burden falls on the prosecutor
when the mistrial has been declared over the objections of the defendant, and
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In the case at bar, the defendant had been indicted for the
criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. His
trial was prematurely terminated by the judge during the course
of jury deliberations. The deliberations were interrupted by the
judge when he determined that it was necessary to inform one of
the jurors that her nephew had been shot and killed. The juror
felt unable to continue with deliberations, the remaining eleven
jurors were dismissed, and a mistrial was declared due to mani-
fest necessity. The defense objected and then moved to bar retrial
under the double jeopardy doctrine. 185 The essence of
defendant's argument was that the mistrial had been declared
after the jury had been sworn, hence double jeopardy had
attached and retrial was barred. 186
The court began its analysis with a brief review of double jeop-
ardy principles and relied upon relevant federal and state case
law187 interchangeably. The law is clear that "once a jury has
been sworn, jeopardy has attached." ' 188 Nevertheless, "absent
defendant's consent or misconduct, a defendant can be retried
following a post-swearing declaration of mistrial only where such
declaration of mistrial was 'manifestly necessary."' 189 "The bur-
that the trial must be terminated before completion due to "circumstances
making it impossible or impractical to proceed further").
185. Smith, 149 Misc. 2d at 346-47, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 1013.
186. Id. at 347, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 1013.
187. The court made no distinction between the federal and state doctrines
of double jeopardy and manifest necessity, thus suggesting that analysis of
these claims would be similar under federal and state law. d. at 348, 563
N.Y.S.2d at 1014. The leading Supreme Court cases in this area include: Crist
v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978) (holding that the federal constitutional standards
of double jeopardy apply equally to the states); Illinois v. Somerville, 410
U.S. 458 (1973); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963); United
States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579 (1824).
188. Smith, 149 Misc. 2d at 347, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 1014. LaFave states that
"when the jury is 'empaneled [sic] and sworn,' that is when the entire jury has
been selected and has taken the oath required for service at trial." LAFAVE &
ISRAEL, supra note 184, at 63 (citations omitted).
189. Smith, 149 Misc. 2d at 347, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 1014 (citing
Colcloughley v. Johnson, 115 A.D.2d 58, 499 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1st Dep't
1986)). The manifest necessity term originated in the 1824 case of United
States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579 (1824), which stated:
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den of establishing manifest necessity is on the prosecutor." 190
The court must engage in a balancing test when determining
whether to declare a manifest necessity mistrial. This balancing
must weigh the defendant's interest in a particular tribunal decid-
ing the outcome of his case against the public's interest in fair
trials "designed to end in just judgments." 191
The court next discussed some of the exceptional circumstances
necessary to prevent double jeopardy from attaching. One type of
exceptional circumstance meeting this standard consists of some
occurrence rendering it physically impossible to proceed with the
trial, such as death or serious illness of the judge or other essen-
tial court personnel." ' 192 However, the court's excusing a jury
based upon an inconvenience to the remaining jurors has been
ruled reversible error. 193 Additionally, jeopardy may not attach
when there is a "hung jury" or "fatal legal defect in the
case. " 19
4
The court noted that it was unable to locate cases with the same
facts as the case at bar. However, the court did discuss People v.
Magee, 195 because the facts of Magee were the converse of the
Smith case. In Magee, a juror had been informed of his mother's
death during deliberations, but the juror had expected the death
We think that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested Courts of
justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict,
whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into
consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act or the ends of
public justice would otherwise be defeated.
Id. at 579 (emphasis added).
190. Smith, 149 Misc. 2d at 347, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 1014, (citing Dickson v.
Morgenthau, 102 A.D.2d 168, 476 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1st Dep't 1984)).
191. Id. at 347-48, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 1014 (citing Hall v. Potoker, 49
N.Y.2d 501, 403 N.E.2d 1210, 427 N.Y.S.2d 211 (1980)). The original
formulation of the balancing test appears in the Supreme Court case of Wade
v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949). The wording is identical, thus showing that
New York has adopted the federal constitutional standards. See supra note 183
and accompanying text.
192. Smith, 149 Misc. 2d at 348, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 1014 (citing People ex
rel. Epting v. Deove, 309 N.Y. 818, 130 N.E.2d 616 (1955)).
193. Smith, 149 Misc. 2d at 348, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 1014.
194. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 184, at 71.
195. 122 A.D.2d 227, 504 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1986).
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and, thus, chose to continue with the deliberations. 196
The court in Magee affirmed the judgment of conviction, and
ruled that it was not an abuse of discretion to allow the
deliberations to continue, especially in light of the fact that the
juror had wanted to remain and had been instructed not to inform
the other jurors of the death in his family. Similarly, the court
reasoned in Smith that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion
in informing a juror of the death of her nephew. Furthermore, in
recognizing the juror's inability to continue deliberations, it was
not an abuse of discretion to declare a mistrial. The court,
therefore, concluded that the People met their burden to
demonstrate the existence of manifest necessity. 197 Thus, the
defendant's motion was denied since his right not to be subject to
double jeopardy was not violated. 198
196. Smith, 149 Misc. 2d at 348, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 1014.
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